BEFORE THE
STATE OF FLORIDA
COMMISSION ON ETHICS
In re CHARLES BIGELOW, )
Complaint No. 89-16
)
Respondent. )
)
_____________________________)
RECOMMENDED PUBLIC
REPORT OF HEARING OFFICER
This matter was initiated by the filing of a complaint by Patricia
I. Stumbaugh, who alleged that the Respondent, Charles Bigelow, violated
various provisions of the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees and
Article II, Section 8, Florida Constitution.
Following a preliminary investigation, the Commission on Ethics found
probable cause and ordered a public hearing on the following five issues:
(1) Whether the Respondent, as a member of the Lee County Local
Planning Agency, violated Section 112.3145, Florida Statutes, by failing to
file financial disclosure for the years 1983 and 1984;
(2) Whether the Respondent, as a member of the Lee County Board
of County Commissioners, violated Article II, Section 8(a) and (h), Florida
Constitution, by failing to properly and timely file financial disclosure as
required by Article II, Section 8 of the Florida Constitution, for the years
1986 and 1987;
(3) Whether the
Respondent violated Section 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, by voting as a
member of the Board of County Commissioners in June, 1987, on the approval of
the HealthPark, Florida DRI;
(4) Whether the
Respondent violated Section 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, by voting as a
member of the Board of County Commissioners in January, 1989, on the approval
of Site H for a proposed landfill; and
(5) Whether the
Respondent, as a member of the Board of County Commissioners, violated Section
112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by corruptly using his official position to
propose and approve the Healthpark, Florida DRI site in order to benefit
himself or persons having interests in adjacent property.
A public hearing was held on Friday, April 6, 1990, in Fort Myers,
Florida, before the undersigned member of the Commission on Ethics, who served
as Hearing Officer for the Commission.
Craig B. Willis, Assistant Attorney General, appeared as Advocate for
the Commission; the Respondent was represented by Patrick E. Geraghty, Esq.
At the public hearing the Advocate called the following
witnesses: Charles Bigelow, Frieda
Bigelow, James Nathan, Kenneth Wilkinson, and Marsha Segal-George. The Respondent called the following
witnesses: Walter Smith, Terry Dillon,
Michael Ciccarone, and Patricia Stumbaugh.
Various exhibits presented by the parties were received in evidence and
a Prehearing Stipulation containing stipulated facts was filed by the parties.
The Advocate and the Respondent both submitted written closing
arguments; in addition, the Respondent submitted a brief statement of proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
All of these have been considered by the Hearing Officer. Specific rulings on the proposed findings of
fact are set forth in the appendix to this order. References to the transcript of the hearing are denoted by the
letter "T", followed by the page number; references to the Prehearing
Stipulation are made by the abbreviation "Stip.", followed by the
page number; references to the Advocate's and the Respondent's exhibits are
made as "AE" and "RE" respectively, followed by the exhibit
number and page number, if applicable.
RECOMMENDED RULINGS ON
PRE-HEARING MOTIONS
Prior to the public hearing of this complaint, the Respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the complaint should be dismissed on
several grounds, and a Motion for More Definite Statement, arguing that the
issues set forth in the Notice of Hearing were not sufficiently specific to
allow him to prepare a defense to the charges.
Under Commission Rule 34-5.0184, F.A.C., a ruling by the Hearing Officer
on such motions is to be incorporated in the recommended public report and can
be finally disposed of only by the Commission.
Having determined earlier in separate orders that both motions should be
denied, those orders are hereby incorporated into this Recommended Public
Report as recommendations that the Commission deny the Repondent's Motion to
Dismiss and the Respondent's Motion for More Definite Statement.
From the evidence presented at the hearing, the undersigned
Hearing Officer finds as follows:
ISSUE 1
1. The Respondent, Charles
Bigelow, was appointed to the Lee County Local Planning Agency (LPA) on
December 28, 1983. He was notified of
this appointment by United States Mail on January 3, 1984, and was sworn as a
member of the LPA at some time after January 3, 1984. Stip., 2; AE 3.
2. The Respondent served
as a member of the LPA during most of the year 1984, resigning in the latter
part of that year. T 18, 20. His replacement on the LPA was appointed on
or about January 17, 1985. T 140.
3. The major work of the
LPA involved a comprehensive amendment to the County's comprehensive plan. T 20.
4. The letter notifying
the Respondent of his appointment as a member of the LPA advised him that he
was subject to the financial disclosure law and that he had 45 days from the
date of his appointment to file the necessary papers. AE 3. The letter also
advised him that the disclosure forms were available in the Supervisor of Elections
office in the Courthouse. AE 3. The Respondent recalled receiving the letter
notifying him of his appointment. T 19.
5. The Respondent also was
sent notice by the Lee County Supervisor of Elections Office on or before June
1, 1984, advising him that he needed to file CE Form 1 for 1983 by July 1,
1984. AE 1; Stip., 3. Subsequently, the Supervisor of Elections
Office sent another letter to the Respondent by certified mail; that letter was
picked up at the post office on July 10, 1984.
AE 1; AE 2. As the Respondent
did not file the disclosure statement with the Supervisor's Office by September
4, 1984, the Supervisor of Elections included the Respondent's name on her
certified list of persons who had not filed the Form 1 by that deadline. AE 1; AE 2.
6. The signature on the
the certified mail receipt from the Supervisor's Office, picked up from the
post office on July 10, 1984, is not the Respondent's and is illegible. Stip., 3; AE 1; AE 2. The Respondent states that while he could
not positively identify the signature on the certified mail receipt attached to
the notification sent to him by the Supervisor of Elections, he did have an
employee at his law firm during this time who served as a "runner,"
whose name is Kiki. Stip., 3. From the certified mail receipt, it appears
that the signature could be that of an individial named "Kiki." AE 2.
The Respondent, however, has no recollection of having been advised of
the need to file CE Form 1 while a member of the LPA. Stip., 3.
7. The Respondent did not
file a Statement of Financial Interests (CE Form 1) for the year 1983 or for
the year 1984. Stip., 3; AE 1; AE 2; T
56.
8. The Lee County LPA and
the Respondent's name were listed in a letter dated March 1, 1984, to the
Florida Commission on Ethics from the Lee County Administrator's Office. This letter advised which Lee County
committees and employees were required to file financial disclosure. Stip., 3.
9. The Commission on Ethics'
Financial Disclosure Notification Mailing List and its Agency Coordinators
Updated Printout sent to Lee County, listing the individuals and committees
required to file under the financial disclosure law (Section 112.3145, Florida
Statutes), did not include the Respondent or the LPA. Stip., 3-4.
ISSUE 2
10. On July 18, 1986, the
Respondent qualified to run for County Commissioner of Lee County. At that time, he filed a CE Form 6. AE 4.
The Respondent did not file a CE Form 6 again until December 16, 1988,
disclosing his net worth, assets, and liabilities as of December 31, 1987,
along with copies of his tax returns for 1986 and 1987. Stip., 4; T 56-57; AE 5.
11. The Respondent served as
a member of the Board of County Commissioners for Lee County from November of
1986 until February of 1990, at which time he resigned. Stip., 4.
ISSUES 3 and 5
12. In 1977, the
Respondent and Bob Bass, a local real estate broker, put together a group of
investors and bought a tract of land in Lee County, consisting of approximately
400 acres. T 25, 128. Bass and the Respondent were co-trustees for
the group, called the "310 Land Trust"; the Respondent held a 5%
beneficial interest in the trust. T 25;
Stip., 5.
13. Portions of the property
owned by the 310 Land Trust were sold in 1977, 1978, and 1981, so that by February
of 1987 the assets of the trust consisted only of 38.5 acres of land and a
purchase money mortgage receivable from a prior sale of trust properties some
seven years before. Stip., 5; T 26-27,
38-40, 128. There was one last
installment payment due on the mortgage.
Stip., 5. The 38.5 acre parcel
was located south and east of Summerlin Road, but was separated from Summerlin
Road by a Florida Power and Light easement; the parcel fronts on Winkler Road,
which intersects Summerlin Road north of the parcel. T 24-25, 40-41; AE 9.
14. In February of 1987, at
the request of his former wife, Frieda Bigelow, the Respondent assigned to her
his five percent beneficial interest in the 310 Land Trust, excluding his
interest in the payment receivable, in return for her ownership interest in 27
acres of property north of the Caloosahatchee River of equal value. AE 6, AE 7; Stip., 5. The Respondent's former wife originated the
exchange of interests, initially contacting the Respondent in December of 1986
about his buying her undivided one-third interest in the 27 acre riverfront
parcel because she no longer wished to own property jointly with him. T 77, 83-84. When the Respondent indicated that he could not purchase the
interest, Ms. Bigelow offered to exchange property interests. T 77, 84.
15. Ms. Bigelow has been
licensed as a real estate broker since the 1970's; the 38.5 acre parcel was
listed through the office in which she worked and she was aware that the asking
price was $35,000 per acre. T
77-78. She believed that the 27 acre
riverfront parcel was worth $7,000 to $8,000 per acre. T 78.
The Lee County Property Appraiser testified that $35,000 per acre was a
reasonable asking price for the 38.5 acre parcel, given comparable sales in the
vicinity. T 127. [NOTE:
At $7,500 per acre, Ms. Bigelow's one-third interest in the 27 acre
parcel was worth $67,500; at $35,000 per acre, the Respondent's 5% interest in
the 38.5 acre parcel was worth $67,375.]
16. In March of 1987, again
at the request of his former wife, the Respondent assigned his interest as
co-trustee for said property to Frieda Bigelow and Bob Bass by a quitclaim
deed. Stip., 5. The Respondent received no compensation for
transferring his title as co-trustee. T
85-86.
17. Beginning in 1980 or
1981, prior to his election to the Board of County Commissioners, the
Respondent served as the attorney for the Board of Directors of Lee Memorial
Hospital, a public hospital. T 39;
Stip., 4.
18. In early 1983 the
Hospital Board and its President began looking for a site in the area of
Summerlin Road on which to locate a satellite hospital. T 89.
Eventually, this concept grew into that of a healthpark, involving the
public hospital, its nonprofit support corporation, and other organizations in a
joint venture, with the idea that the hospital could purchase more land than
was immediately necessary in order to control and profit from health-related
growth in the area next to its location.
T 93-118. The Hospital's
President, James Nathan, was responsible for picking the site; as legal counsel
for the Hospital, the Respondent was responsible for obtaining options on the
property that had been selected. T
21-24, 98-105, 118. The site was
selected by the end of 1984. T 107-108,
113. The project was known as
HealthPark, Florida. Stip., 4.
19. Following
conversations between the Assistant County Attorney and a member of the staff
of the Commission on Ethics about the Respondent's serving as attorney for the
hospital, the Respondent resigned his position as Hospital Board attorney on
June 5, 1987. T 47-54, 119-121,
143-151; Stip., 4.
20. On June 8, 1987, the
Respondent voted, as a member of the Board of County Commissioners, to approve
the HealthPark Florida Development of Regional Impact (DRI). This vote rezoned the HealthPark property
from agricultural to hospital and gave the developers the approval to proceed
to build the project. Stip., 4. The HealthPark property was located east of
the 38.5 acre parcel, on the other side of Summerlin Road. AE 9.
21. In June of 1987, the
Respondent did not have any beneficial interest in the 38.5 acres comprising
the 310 Land Trust and he realized no financial gain as a result of the vote to
rezone the property. Stip., 5. He subsequently received his share of the
final mortgage payment due from the purchase money mortgage. T 30.
22. In 1988 the 38.5 acre
parcel was sold. T 30-31, 129. Ms.
Bigelow received a portion of the proceeds from that sale, but the Respondent
received no portion of the proceeds, either from Ms. Bigelow or as a result of
the sale. T 31, 82-83. At the time of the sale, the Respondent was
asked to provide another quitclaim deed to resolve a title question that had
arisen in connection with the closing on the property; he did so. T 30-31.
23. The undersigned
Hearing Officer takes official notice of Commission records appearing in its
file for the earlier case of Complaint No. 87-49, In re Charles L. Bigelow,
Jr., as follows. The issue presented in
that case was whether the Respondent violated Section 112.3143(3), Florida
Statutes, by voting on the HealthPark, Florida DRI because of his relationship
to Lee Memorial Hospital and the joint venture entity involved in the DRI as
their attorney. Following a preliminary
investigation and a supplemental investigation, the Commission found no
probable cause to believe that the Respondent had violated Section 112.3143(3),
as alleged. The Commission's finding
was based on the recommendation of the Commission Advocate that the Respondent
had resigned as attorney prior to the HealthPark vote, that there was no
evidence of continued representation of the HealthPark development during the
five-month period of his resignation, and that therefore the approval of the
DRI could not be said to have inured to the special gain of a principal by whom
he was retained.
24. The Respondent's
involvement as an attorney for Lee Memorial Hospital and the joint venture
seeking DRI approval was not at issue in this proceeding, that having been the
subject of Commission Complaint No. 87-49, In re Charles L. Bigelow, Jr. Although that relationship was not at issue
in this proceeding, it should be noted that no evidence was presented at the
public hearing that would have contradicted the evidence developed in the
earlier proceeding. No evidence was
presented that would have indicated that the Respondent was retained at the
time of the vote by any other principal who would have received gain as a
result of the approval of the DRI.
ISSUE 4
25. In 1973, a limited
partnership, Wildcat Farms, Ltd., purchased a tract of approximately 6,700
acres in Lee County. T 60-61. In 1978 a group of businessmen, including
the Respondent, purchased one limited partnership unit in Wildcat Farms, Ltd.,
through a trust of which they were beneficial owners. T 34, 61.
26. By 1989, Wildcat Farms
consisted of approximately 3,520 to 4,300 acres. T 34, 61-62; Stip., 6.
The Respondent's interest in Wildcat Farms amounted to about a 1.7%
beneficial interest. T 34, 61; Stip.,
6.
27. For some time the County
had known that the useful life of its current landfill site was limited. The County was looking for a new site for
its solid waste program, which would include a landfill, resource recovery
recycling, and sludge processing facilities, and had hired a consulting firm to
locate and evaluate potential sites. T
31-33, 132-133.
28. On October 19, 1988,
the Lee County Board of County Commissioners met and considered eight staff
recommendations for implementing a 40-year Solid Waste Management Master
Plan. T 134; AE 11. The Respondent voted with the majority of
the County Commission to select the area designated as Site H, to authorize the
consulting firm to proceed with design and permitting for the site, to
negotiate a new long term contract with Waste Management (its current landfill
operator), and to have Waste Management secure Site H for the new
facilities. T 32, 133-35; AE 11.
29. On or about January,
1989, the Respondent voted to approve a Solid Waste Disposal Extension
Agreement between the County and Waste Management Services. Stip., 6.
Part of this agreement was the approval of Site H as a County landfill
and resource recovery site. Stip., 6; T
32-33. Ultimately, Waste Management
purchased Site H, the County decided to seek the usage of a site in Hendry
County for the landfill, and Waste Management began seeking a purchaser for the
property. T 33, 55, 136-37.
30. The Wildcat Farms
property does not abut Site H, as ultimately purchased by Waste Management;
Site H is located approximately one and one-half miles from Wildcat Farms, when
measured between the two closest corners of the two parcels. T 36; AE 12; Stip., 6.
31. One of the County
staff's proposals relating to Site H and the County's 40-year Solid Waste
Management Master Plan was an extension of Alico Road. Stip., 6; AE 11. This road would not have passed Wildcat Farms and would not have
provided additional direct access to Wildcat Farms. T 35-37, 45, 72-73; Stip., 6.
No evidence was presented that indicated that the extension of Alico
Road would have increased the value of the Wildcat Farms property beyond the
same, general increase in value that would have resulted for all property in
the portion of the County that would have been served by the road. T 45-46.
The Respondent voted not to approve the Alico Road extension. T 135-36; AE 11; Stip., 6. An extension of Alico Road is not a part of
the County's current five-year road plan.
T 137; Stip., 6.
32. The Wildcat Farms
property that had not been sold was used for cattle grazing and for hunting,
camping, and other recreational purposes by its owners, although no
recreational facilities were located on the property. T 64, 66-67. In 1983-85
the property was listed for sale at approximately $2,900 per acre. T 64.
Subsequently, the County's Comprehensive Plan took away the commercial
and industrial zoning designations for portions of the property and allowable
density dropped to one unit per five acres or one unit per 20 or 40 acres,
depending on location. T 65. As a result, the owners obtained permitting
to allow citrus groves on the property.
T 65. In 1989, 600 acres of
Wildcat Farms was under option at a price of $1,800 per acre for the first year
and $1,900 per acre for the second year.
T 62. The entire property
currently is subject to an option to purchase at less than $1,900 per acre,
although the asking price now is around $2,100 per acre. T 62-63.
The President of the general partner in Wildcat Farms, Ltd., testified
that in his opinion locating the landfill at Site H would have had a negative
impact on the value of the property, because of the long-term potential for
toxic and hazardous waste leaching into the aquifers that run beneath the
property and because the increase in heavy truck traffic would destroy State
Road 82, the main access road to Wildcat Farms. T 45, 62-63, 69-71.
ISSUE 1
Section 112.3145(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), provided that
each "local officer" "shall file a statement of financial
interests no later than July 1 of each year" and that each "local
officer" who was appointed "shall file a statement of financial
interests within 30 days from the date of appointment". Section 112.3145(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes
(1983), defined the term "local officer" as follows:
Any appointed member of a board; commission;
authority, including any expressway authority or transportation authority
established by general law; community college district board of trustees; or
council of any political subdivision of the state, excluding any member of an
advisory body. A governmental body with
land-planning, zoning, or natural resources responsibilities shall not be
considered an advisory body.
The term "advisory
body" was defined in Section 112.312(1), Florida Statutes (1983), to mean:
any board, commission,
committee, council, or authority, however selected, whose total budget,
appropriations, or authorized expenditures constitute less than 1 percent of
the budget of each agency it serves or $100,000, whichever is less, and whose
powers, jurisdiction, and authority are solely advisory and do not include the
final determination or adjudication of any personal or property rights, duties,
or obligations, other than those relating to its internal operations.
Section 112.3145(5),
Florida Statutes (1983), prescribed the procedure under which the Commission on
Ethics was to prepare a current list of the persons who were to file statements
of financial interests (CE Form 1) by the following July 1st. Section 112.3145(5)(e) and (f) provided:
(e)
Any state officer, local officer, or specified employee whose name is
not on the mailing list provided to the Secretary of State or supervisor of
elections is not subject to the penalties provided in s. 112.317 for failure to
timely file a statement of financial interests in any year in which the
omission occurred.
(f)
The requirements of this subsection do not apply to candidates or to the
first filing required of any state officer, specified employee, or local
officer.
ISSUE 2
Article II, Section 8(a) and (h), Florida Constitution, provide in
relevant part:
(a)
All elected constitutional officers and candidates for such offices and,
as may be determined by law, other public officers, candidates, and employees
shall file full and public disclosure of their financial interests.
(h)
Schedule--On the effective date of this amendment and until changed by
law:
(1) Full and
public disclosure of financial interests shall mean filing with the secretary
of state by July 1 of each year a sworn statement showing net worth and identifying
each asset and liability in excess of $1,000 and its value together with one of
the following:
a. A copy of the
person's most recent federal income tax return; or
b. A sworn
statement which identifies each separate source and amount of income which
exceeds $1,000.
ISSUES 3 and 4
Section 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, provides:
No county, municipal, or other local public
officer shall vote in his official capacity upon any measure which inures to
his special private gain or shall knowingly vote in his official capacity upon
any measure which inures to the special gain of any principal, other than an
agency as defined in s. 112.312(2), by whom he is retained. Such public officer shall, prior to the vote
being taken, publicly state to the assembly the nature of his interest in the
matter from which he is abstaining from
voting and, within 15 days after the vote occurs, disclose the nature of his
interest as a public record in a memorandum filed with the person responsible
for recording the minutes of the meeting, who shall incorporate the memorandum
in the minutes. However, a commissioner of a community
redevelopment agency created or designated pursuant to s. 163.356 or s. 163.357
or an officer of an independent special tax district elected on a one-acre,
one-vote basis is not prohibited from voting.
ISSUE 5
Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, provides:
MISUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION.--No public
officer or employee of an agency shall corruptly use or attempt to use his
official position or any property or resource which may be within his trust, or
perform his official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or
exemption for himself or others. This
section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31.
For purposes of this
statute, the term "corruptly" is defined by Section 112.312(7),
Florida Statutes, as follows:
'Corruptly' means done with a wrongful
intent and for the purpose of obtaining, or compensating or receiving
compensation for, any benefit resulting from some act or omission of a public
servant which is inconsistent with the proper performance of his public duties.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the undersigned Hearing
Officer recommends that the Commission on Ethics make the following conclusions
of law:
1. The Respondent, Charles
Bigelow, as a member of the Lee County Local Planning Agency and as a County
Commissioner for Lee County at all times material to this complaint, was a
public officer subject to the provisions of the Code of Ethics for Public
Officers and Employees contained in Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes,
and the provisions of Article II, Section 8, Florida Constitution. The Respondent is subject to the continuing
jurisdiction of the State of Florida Commission on Ethics.
ISSUE 1
2. Members of the Lee
County Local Planning Agency were "local officers" subject to the
requirement of filing statements of financial interests under Section 112.3145,
Florida Statutes, as they were appointed members of a board of a political
subdivision of the State having land-planning responsibilities. See, among others, Commission on Ethics
advisory opinions CEO 75-190, CEO 76-156, and CEO 76-159.
3. Therefore, at the time
the Respondent received notice in January of 1984 that he had been appointed as
a member of the Lee County Local Planning Agency, he was required to file a
statement of financial interests (Commission on Ethics Form 1) with the local
Supervisor of Elections within 30 days.
Section 112.3145(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983).
4. Had the Respondent
filed Form 1 within 30 days of his appointment to the LPA, the information
contained in his disclosure statement would have been reflective of his
financial interests during the disclosure period 1983. This is because Section 112.312(8), Florida
Statutes (1983), defined the term "disclosure period" as follows:
'Disclosure period' means the taxable year
for the person or business entity, whether based on a calendar or fiscal year,
immediately preceding the date on which, or the last day of the period during
which, the financial disclosure statement required by this part is required to
be filed.
See, also, Commission on
Ethics opinion CEO 76-60 (question 6).
5. As the Respondent never
filed a Form 1 as a member of the LPA, he violated Section 112.3145, Florida
Statutes (1983), by failing to file financial disclosure for the year 1983.
6. As a "local
officer," the Respondent was required to file a Form 1 by July 1, 1984, or
at least by the end of the grace period that expired September 1, 1984. Section 112.3145(2)(b) and (5), Florida
Statutes (1983). He failed to do so,
thereby also violating Section 112.3145, Florida Statutes (1983), by failing to
file financial disclosure for the year 1983.
Had he filed within 30 days of his appointment he would not have been
required to file a second time during 1984.
The disclosure period for all forms filed during 1984 was the year 1983,
as noted above, and Section 112.3145(6), Florida Statutes (1983), provided that
a public official who had filed a disclosure for any calendar year was not
required to file a second disclosure for the same year unless qualifying as a
candidate for public office.
7. However, the Respondent
did not violate Section 112.3145, Florida Statutes, by failing to file a Form 1
disclosing his financial interests for the year 1984. Under the statutory scheme, disclosure statements for the year
1984 were those filed during 1985. The
Respondent, however, was not required to file a statement of financial
interests in 1985, for the following reason.
As interpreted by the Commission in opinions CEO 84-32, CEO 84-33, and
CEO 84-34, persons who were not in a "local officer" position at the
end of calendar year 1984 were not subject to the requirement of filing Form 1
by July 1, 1985, which would have covered financial interests held during 1984. As the record of this proceeding indicates
that the Respondent left the LPA before the end of 1984, he was not required to
file Form 1 during 1985 (for the year 1984).
ISSUE 2
8. As a member of the Lee
County Board of County Commissioners during 1987 and 1988, the Respondent was
an elected constitutional officer required to file full and public disclosure
of his financial interests (Commission on Ethics Form 6) with the Secretary of
State no later than July 1st of each of those years. Article II, Section 8(a) and (h), Florida Constitution. These provisions require filing a sworn
statement showing net worth, assets and liabilities in excess of $1,000
together with either a copy of the person's most recent federal income tax
return or a sworn statement of sources and amounts of income exceeding $1,000
and of secondary sources of income. The
Form 6 promulgated by the Commission allows the statement of net worth, assets,
and liabilities to be as of December 31st of the prior year or a more current date
(presumably, a date between December 31st and July 1st, when the form is
due). As is the case with the Form 1
disclosure, the information on the Form 6 disclosure regarding income
necessarily would relate to the preceding calendar year (Commission Rule
34-8.005, F.A.C., requires the statement of sources and amounts of income to
cover the preceding tax year, and one's most recent federal income tax return
also would be for the preceding tax year).
9. The Respondent filed no
financial disclosure statement whatsoever during 1987 and failed to file his
Form 6 in 1988 until December 16th, five and one-half months after the July 1st
deadline. At that time, he disclosed
his net worth, assets, and liabilities as of December 31, 1987, and filed
copies of his tax returns for 1986 and 1987.
Accordingly, the Respondent violated Article II, Section 8(a) and (h),
Florida Constitution, by failing to timely file full and public disclosure of
his financial interests for the year 1986, as he filed almost one and one-half
years late, and by failing to properly file full and public disclosure for the
year 1986, as he did not disclose his assets, liabilities, and net worth during
the period from December 31, 1986 to July 1, 1987. In addition, the Respondent violated Article II, Section 8(a) and
(h), Florida Constitution, by failing to timely file full and public disclosure
for the year 1987, as he did not file for that year until five and one-half
months after the July 1st deadline.
ISSUE 3
10. The Respondent did not
violate Section 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, by voting as a member of the
Board of County Commissioners in June, 1987, on the approval of the HealthPark,
Florida DRI.
11. Section 112.3143(3),
Florida Statutes, would have prohibited the Respondent from voting on the
HealthPark, Florida DRI if that measure had inured to his special private
gain. Having exchanged his beneficial
interest in the 38.5 acre parcel with his former wife approximately three
months before the vote, the Respondent had no beneficial interest in that
parcel and, so, could not have benefited from any increase in the parcel's
value that might have resulted from the approval of the HealthPark. In addition, prior to the vote, he had
assigned any interest he might have had in the parcel as a co-trustee. The Respondent did not receive any gain from
the subsequent sale of that parcel. Nor
did the circumstances of the exchange of property interests with his former
wife indicate that the Respondent stood to gain from the approval of the DRI. She initiated the exchange, which was based
on an asking price deemed reasonable by the Property Appraiser, in light of
comparable sales in the area. Finally,
although the Respondent did receive a share of the final mortgage payment that
was due to the 310 Land Trust, there was no evidence indicating that the
payment was contingent in any way upon the approval of the HealthPark, Florida
DRI.
12. Section 112.3143(3),
Florida Statutes, also would have prohibited the Respondent from voting on the
HealthPark, Florida DRI if that measure had inured to the special gain of a
principal by whom he was retained. The
Respondent's involvement as an attorney for Lee Memorial Hospital and the joint
venture seeking DRI approval was not at issue in this proceeding, that having
been the subject of Commission Complaint No. 87-49, In re Charles L. Bigelow,
Jr. Although that relationship was not
at issue in this proceeding, it should be noted that no evidence was presented
at the public hearing that would have contradicted the evidence developed in
the earlier proceeding. No evidence was
presented that would have indicated that the Respondent was retained at the
time of the vote by any other principal who would have received gain as a
result of the approval of the DRI.
ISSUE 4
13. The Respondent did not
violate Section 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, by voting as a member of the
Board of County Commissioners in January, 1989, on the approval of Site H for
the proposed landfill.
14. Although the
Respondent had about a 1.7% beneficial interest in the Wildcat Farms, Ltd.,
property, approval of Site H for the proposed landfill did not result in any
special gain to him through a change in the value of that property. The Wildcat Farms property was located
approximately one and one-half miles from the nearest part of Site H. The testimony indicated that, if anything,
the property's value would have been diminished in terms of the use for which it
currently is permitted, citrus production.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the asking price for the property has
not changed significantly since it was determined that the landfill would not
be located at Site H. Rather, it
appears that the most significant change in the value of the property resulted
from the adoption of the County's Comprehensive Plan, which occurred before the
Respondent became a County Commissioner.
No evidence was presented that indicated that the proposed extension of
Alico Road would have increased the value of the Wildcat Farms property beyond
the same, general increase in value that would have resulted for all property
in the portion of the County that would have been served by the road. Finally, no evidence was presented that
would have indicated that the Respondent was retained at the time of the vote
by any principal who would have received gain as a result of the approval of
Site H or Alico Road.
ISSUE 5
15. With respect to an
alleged violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, the Advocate must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that:
a. The Respondent was either a public officer or
a public employee;
b. The Respondent used or attempted to use his
official position or property or resources within his trust, or performed his
official duties.
c. The Respondent's actions were done with an
intent to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself or
others; and
d. The Respondent's actions were done
"corruptly," that is,
(1) done with a wrongful
intent, and
(2) done for the purpose
of benefiting from some act or omission which was inconsistent with the proper
performance of public duties.
16. The evidence clearly
showed that the majority of the approximately 400 acres originally purchased by
the 310 Land Trust had been sold before the Hospital decided where it would
locate the HealthPark. The Respondent
did not select the HealthPark site, as that decision was made by the Hospital
Board and the President of the Hospital.
All of these events took place before the Respondent sought election to
the County Commission.
17. At the time of the
County Commission's vote on the proposed HealthPark DRI, the Respondent had no
legal or beneficial interest in the 310 Land Trust aside from the right to
receive a portion of the final mortgage payment. Therefore, as explained above, he did not stand to benefit from
the decision to approve the DRI. Nor
was there any evidence presented that would have indicated that the Respondent
had any reason to benefit his former wife, who at the time owned the beneficial
interest in the Trust's remaining 38.5 acres, or any other person by voting to
approve the DRI.
18. Accordingly, the
Respondent did not violate Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by corruptly
using his official position as a member of the Board of County Commissioners to
propose and approve the HealthPark, Florida DRI site in order to benefit
himself or persons having interests in adjacent property, as alleged.
Although during the time he served as a member of the Board of
County Commissioners the Respondent failed to timely and properly file full and
public disclosure of his financial interests, as required by Article II,
Section 8, Florida Constitution, there are no penalties which can be
recommended by the Commission on Ethics to be imposed upon him for these
violations. The constitutional
provision does not provide any explicit penalties. Until the Legislature adopts a statute that would provide penalties
directed at those elected constitutional officers who fail to comply with this
financial disclosure requirement, there can be no penalty imposed for this
violation.
On the other hand, Section 112.317(1), Florida Statutes, specifies
penalties applicable to a public official who has violated a provision of the
Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees contained in Chapter 112. Of the possible penalties provided in
Section 112.317(1)(a), Florida Statutes, only three are potentially applicable
to a public officer who, like the Respondent, no longer holds office: public censure and reprimand; a civil
penalty not exceeding $5,000; and restitution of any pecuniary benefits
received because of the violation committed.
It has not been shown that the Respondent received any pecuniary
benefits because of the financial disclosure violation found here, so
restitution would not be an appropriate penalty.
At the time the Respondent was appointed to the Local Planning Agency, he was notified of the requirement to file financial disclosure. In addition, the evidence indicates that he received two more notices of the requirement to file during 1984 as a member of the LPA. Had he filed financial disclosure on a timely basis while serving as a member of the Board of County Commissioners, he might be able to argue that his failure to file as a member of the LPA was an oversight. However, the sum of the evidence presented indicates that the Respondent's failure to file was more than simple negligence on his part--it amounted to a deliberate disregard for the requirements of the law.
The Respondent does argue that because his name was not on the
financial disclosure notification list provided to the Supervisor of Elections
in 1984, he is not subject to any penalty for failing to file during that
year. Section 112.3145(5)(e), Florida
Statutes (1983), did provide that any local officer whose name was not on the
mailing list is not subject to the imposition of penalties for failure to file
in that year; it is undisputed that the Respondent's name did not appear on the
list.
Clearly, the purpose of this provision was to excuse from penalty
those persons who were not notified of their obligation to file, although the
provision does not excuse the actual requirement to file. Nevertheless, under the terms of Section
112.3145(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1983), the first filing by an official
(within 30 days of appointment) was exempted from the statute's provisions
regarding the mailing list and the correlative provision regarding no penalty
for not being included on the mailing list.
The Respondent clearly received notice of the requirement to file
shortly after his appointment; the fact that his name was not on the mailing list
does not eliminate the possibility of a penalty for his failure to file within
30 days of appointment.
Accordingly, under the circumstances presented it is recommended
that the Commission on Ethics recommend that the Lee County Board of County
Commissioners, as the authority which appointed the Respondent as a member of
the LPA, impose a civil penalty of $500.00 against him.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the undersigned Hearing Officer recommends that the Commission on Ethics enter
a final order and public report finding that the Respondent, Charles Bigelow,
violated Section 112.3145, Florida Statutes, by failing to file financial
disclosure for the year 1983 while a member of the Lee County Local Planning
Agency, and violated Article II, Section 8(a) and (h), Florida Constitution, by
failing to properly and timely file full and public disclosure of his financial
interests for the years 1986 and 1987 while a member of the Lee County Board of
County Commissioners.
The undersigned Hearing Officer also recommends that the
Commission's final order and public report find that the Respondent did not
violate Section 112.3145, Florida Statutes, by failing to file financial
disclosure as a member of the Lee County LPA for the year 1984; did not violate
Section 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, by voting as a member of the Board of
County Commissioners in July, 1987, on the approval of the HealthPark, Florida
DRI; did not violate Section 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, by voting as a
member of the Board of County Commissioners in January, 1989, on the approval
of Site H for a proposed landfill; and did not violate Section 313(6), Florida
Statutes, through using his official position as a member of the Board of County
Commissioners to propose and approve the HealthPark, Florida DRI site in order
to benefit himself or persons having interests in adjacent property, as
alleged.
The undersigned Hearing Officer recommends that the Commission's
order recommend that the Lee County Board of County Commissioners, as the
appointing authority for members of the Local Planning Agency, impose a civil
penalty upon the Respondent in the amount of $500.00 for his violation of
Section 112.3145, Florida Statutes, while serving as a member of the Local
Planning Agency.
ENTERED and respectfully submitted this ____ day of July, 1990.
__________________________
Debra A. Zappi
Hearing Officer and Member
Commission on Ethics
Copies furnished to:
Mr. Patrick E. Geraghty, Attorney for
Respondent
Mr. Craig B. Willis, Commission Advocate
Ms. Patricia I. Stumbaugh, Complainant
APPENDIX
To the extent that the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law submitted by the Respondent contain proposed findings of
fact, the following are rulings on those proposed findings of fact:
Issue 1. Accepted that the Respondent's name was not on
the Commission's mailing list.
Issue 2. Accepted that the Respondent filed a CE Form 6
when he qualified and later disclosed his net worth, assets, and liabilities.
Issue 3. Accepted that the Respondent had divested himself
of any and 5. interest in any property
in the area of the proposed HealthPark.
Issue 4. Accepted that the testimony indicated that, if
anything, the property's value would have been diminished in terms of the use
for which it currently is permitted, citrus production; however, it was not
shown that locating the landfill at Site H was detrimental to the value of the
Wildcat Farms property.