CEO 02-11 -- April 30, 2002
ANTI-NEPOTISM
HIGHWAY PATROL DIRECTOR'S BROTHER
PROMOTED TO MAJOR (TROOP COMMANDER)
To:
The State's anti-nepotism law (Section 112.3135, Florida Statutes) would not be violated were the brother of the Director of the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP), a Division of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, to be promoted to the position of Major (Troop Commander). Under the circumstances of this opinion, the Department's Executive Director (and not the brother/Director) is the "public official" vested with the authority to make the appointment, and the brother/Director will not advocate promotion of his brother.
By your letter of inquiry, a booklet/manual accompanying the letter, telephone conversations between our staff and counsel for the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV or Department), and additional written information provided by Department counsel in response to questions from our staff, we are advised that Christopher A. Knight (Colonel or Director) serves as Director of the Florida Highway Patrol (Patrol or FHP), a Division of the Department, having been appointed in July 2001.
Further, we are advised that the Captain is first on the promotion list for appointment to a Troop Commander (rank of Major) position [a selected exempt service (SES) position] for one of the ten field troops within the Patrol. The promotion process for Troop Commander positions, you advise, has various components, utilizes candidate assessors from outside FHP, operates on an equal, competitive, and objective basis, and has served the Patrol well in recent years in identifying future law enforcement managerial candidates. You emphasize that the Captain has been first on the promotion list for a Troop Commander position since completing examination in June 2001 (a top-of-the-list ranking which predates the Colonel's appointment as head of the Patrol and which is valid through June 30, 2002).[1] In addition, we are advised that the Director of the Patrol (the position currently occupied by the Colonel) neither administers nor oversees the promotion process; and that with the arrival of the Governor's Service First Initiative[2] (which transferred career service positions to selected exempt positions), appointments to Troop Commander (Major) positions are now made by the Department's Executive Director,[3] "upon recommendation of the Patrol."[4]
Thus, in view of the foregoing, you question whether Section 112.3135 would bar the promotion of the Captain (a person whom you describe as a career law enforcement officer who has displayed competence and integrity in his quest to become a higher level manager within the Patrol).[5]
(1)
(a)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(2)(a) A public official may not appoint, employ, promote, or advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a position in the agency in which the official is serving or over which the official exercises jurisdiction or control any individual who is a relative of the public official. An individual may not be appointed, employed, promoted, or advanced in or to a position in an agency if such appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement has been advocated by a public official, serving in or exercising jurisdiction or control over the agency, who is a relative of the individual or if such appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement is made by a collegial body of which a relative of the individual is a member. However, this subsection shall not apply to appointments to boards other than those with land-planning or zoning responsibilities in those municipalities with less than 35,000 population. This subsection does not apply to persons serving in a volunteer capacity who provide emergency medical, firefighting, or police services.
(b)
(3)
(4)
The law prohibits a "public official" from (1)appointing, employing, promoting, or advancing his "relative"
Under the first ("promotion") prong of the prohibition, we find that the law would not be violated under the scenario described. Clearly, the Executive Director of the Department (and not the brother/FHP Director) is the person vested[6] with the authority to promote persons into Troop Commander positions (including the position sought by the Captain).[7]
Under the second ("advocacy" or "recommendation") prong of the prohibition, we also find that the law would not be violated under the scenario described. It is represented to us that neither the Director of the Patrol (the Colonel) nor his command staff will make a recommendation to the Executive Director regarding candidates for the Troop Commander position sought by the Captain; therefore, the advocacy (overt actions) by a public official/relative required for a violation of the law will not be present. See City of Miami Beach v. Galbut
Galbut, at 193 and 194. Clearly, the scenario before us does not indicate any advocacy (overt actions) on the part of the Colonel regarding his brother. In finding that the law would not be violated were the Captain to be promoted under the scenario described, we are not unaware of the argument that the anti-nepotism law should be broadly or liberally interpreted for the public benefit and thus that it should be applied to preclude a promotion of the Captain, thereby arguably fostering public confidence in the employment practices of the Department.[8]
Galbut, at 194. In viewing Galbut as a correct interpretation of the anti-nepotism law, especially regarding the advocacy issue, we have not overlooked our decisions (CEO 93-16 and CEO 98-7) which arguably embody a different interpretation. However, upon examination of these opinions, we are of the view that the facts present in them are distinguishable from the instant scenario or that, in any event, the Galbut Court's view of the statute is applicable to your inquiry.[9] In addition, very recently, in Commission on Ethics Complaint No. 99-083, In re Donald James (Commission Final Order And Public Report rendered January 29, 2002), we determined that a division chief of the Emergency Medical Services Division for the Miami-Dade Fire and Rescue Department violated the anti-nepotism law by advocating the appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement of his brother in or to a position in the Miami-Dade Fire and Rescue Department. In the James matter, the respondent clearly engaged in overt actions in advocating promotion of his brother, and the clear implication of our decision in the James matter is that the anti-nepotism law is not violated where the relative of a "public official" who possesses only recommending/advocacy (not hiring/placement) authority is promoted, absent actual advocacy or recommendation by the public official of his or her relative.
Accordingly, under the particular facts of your inquiry (in which the Colonel institutionally is not the "public official" who would promote his brother and in which he will not advocate promotion of his brother), we find that the anti-nepotism law (a penal statute which, according to the Florida Supreme Court, must be narrowly construed)[10]
ORDERED by the State of Florida Commission on Ethics meeting in public session on April 25, 2002 and RENDERED
Ronald S. Spencer, Jr., Chairman
[1]Regarding the promotion process, we are advised that a Bureau within the Patrol administers the written examination in April of each year, with the twenty highest-scoring candidates progressing to the assessment stage; that a two-part assessment ("in-basket exercise" and "oral interview board"
[2]
[3]
[4]Regarding the Troop Commander position sought by the Captain, we are advised that the Colonel will recuse himself from any recommendation role; that the appointment will be made by the Executive Director acting on the placement achieved by the candidate in the promotion process; that the appointee normally is the top scorer on the list but the Executive Director may choose any one of the top five candidates to fill the opening; that the Patrol's Director or his delegate normally would sign a post-appointment personnel action form to document an employee action filling a Troop Commander position; that the "form is not the appointment document"
[5]Contrary to a popular belief, the anti-nepotism law addresses only hires, promotions, and advancements; it does not prohibit two relatives from working together or one relative from supervising another. See CEO 96-13 and Slaughter v. City of Jacksonville
[6]Your scenario does not indicate that there has been any delegation of this "hiring"
[7]We find that the instant scenario is distinguishable from the facts of Morris v. Seely, 541 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), in which the Court held that the anti-nepotism law applied to preclude promotions of a sheriff's brother. In Morris, unquestionably the sheriff was the public official vested with the hiring/promotion authority, the sheriff had attempted to delegate the authority, and the sheriff signed his brother's appointment papers. In the instant situation represented to us, the Executive Director (not the Director/brother) is the public official vested with the hiring/promotion authority, there is no indication that the Director/brother has been delegated the hiring/promotion authority, and the Director/brother will not be signing any appointment papers concerning the Captain. Also, see City of Miami Beach v. Galbut
[8]The Legislature has expressly broadened the anti-nepotism law via amendment of the language construed in Galbut to, in effect, impute conduct or overt actions to some public officials. See Chapter 94-277, laws of Florida.
[9]In CEO 93-16, we found that a police Captain's brother-in-law could not be promoted into a position for which the Captain was vested with the authority to recommend persons for placement. However, in the scenario of CEO 93-16, the brother-in-law was recommended for the position (apparently by a person acting under an attempted delegation of the Captain's authority); in the instant inquiry, the scenario includes no recommendation from the FHP Director (personally or by a delegate) regarding candidates for the position sought by his brother. CEO 93-16 likely does not discuss or adopt Galbut's view of the law because CEO 93-16 was rendered June 11, 1993, between rendition of Galbut (October 21, 1993) and rendition of the District Court of Appeal's 1992 ruling appealed in Galbut, and because the Commission (as a friend of the Court) took a position in the Galbut litigation contrary to the position of the District Court and contrary to the view of the law ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court. In CEO 98-7, we found that the son-in-law of a police Chief could not be promoted where the Chief possessed (via custom and practices of the city manager) delegated authority to recommend individuals for the position, specifically relying on CEO 93-16 and apparently analogizing attempted ad hoc removal ("back up" to the city manager) of delegated authority to recommend to the attempted delegation ("away") of recommending authority present in CEO 93-16. CEO 98-7 does not mention Galbut.
[10]See Galbut